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Abstract
Tseng et al. have introduced in 2003 an authenticated encryption
scheme by using self-certified public keys. Based on this scheme sev-
eral authors have proposed new signature schemes avoiding some attacks
against the original proposal. In this paper we show that there is a weak-
ness on all these schemes affecting both the authentication of the signer’s
public key and the own security of the system. We propose a slight but
necessary modification to these schemes in order to avoid that weakness.
Keywords: Authenticated encryption, Cryptanalysis, Cryptography, Digital sig-
nature, Self-certified public key.
1 Statement of results and cryptanalysis
As is well known, in self-certified public keys (see [3]) the public key of an user
is obtained from his identity and his private key, such that it is signed by the
∗Corresponding author: luis@iec.csic.es, Tel: (+34) 915618806, Fax: (+34) 914117651.
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system authority by means of system’s private key. In this way, the authentica-
tion of the public key can be carried out with the signature verification and no
certificate to authenticate the signer is necessary. Moreover, in authenticated
encryption schemes (see [4, 6, 7]) the digital signature of a message is generated
by the sender such that only a specified receiver can recover the message and
verify the signature of the sender.
In [1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], the authors have proposed some new signature
schemes for self-certified public keys. We have detected a weakness on these
schemes affecting both the authentication of the signer’s public key and the
own security of the system.
In fact, the hash function used in all these schemes m 7→ h(m) must satisfy
the additional condition gcd(h(m), φ(n)) = 1, where n = pq is the modulus
of the scheme, p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 are two secret 1-safe prime numbers,
and φ(n) denotes totient Euler’s function. This is necessary in order h(m) to
admit an inverse modulo φ(n), which is essential to generate and to verify the
key public of each user. This condition does not hold with the only assumption
imposed by the authors, namely h(m) < min(p′, q′) for every m, as it assures
only that gcd(h(m), p′q′) = 1, but the hash may be an even number and then,
gcd(h(m), φ(n)) = gcd(h(m), 4p′q′) could be 2 or 4. In that case, the system
can be broken as proved in the following
Proposition. With the same notations and hypotheses as above, if
gcd(h(m), φ(n)) ≥ 2
for an input string m, then n can be factored efficiently.
Proof. From the assumption in the statement, we obtain h(r) = 2ν l with
ν ∈ {1, 2}, l being an odd integer and r = Mg−kmodn, where M is the
message, k is a random integer, and g is an integer of order p′q′ in Z∗n.
Let
yU ≡ (fU − IU )
1
h(IU )
modφ(n)modn (1)
be the public key of the user U , where IU is the identity of U , and fU =
gxU modn, xU being the private key of U .
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By virtue of the hypothesis, the equation
uh(r) − fh(r)U ≡ 0modn, u, v ∈ Z,
has four different solutions: ui = y
h(IU )
i + IU , i = 1, . . . , 4, which correspond to
the pairs
(fU mod4, fU mod p′q′), (fU mod 4,−fU mod p′q′),
(−fU mod 4, fU mod p′q′), (−fU mod4,−fU mod p′q′),
in the isomorphism Zn = Z4 × Zp′q′ as follows from the Chinese Remainder
Theorem. Let us assume that u1 = y
h(IU )
U + IU and u2 = −u1. Then, the
following equations hold:
gcd
((
y
h(Ii)
i + IU
)l
− f lU , n
)
= p,
gcd
((
y
h(Ii)
i + IU
)l
+ f lU , n
)
= q,
for i = 3, 4. ¤
Furthermore, if h(r) is even, then the authentication of the public key fails,
as there are four candidates for it, precisely yi, i = 1, . . . , 4.
2 An Example
We can consider an example in order to illustrate this weakness.
Let p = 503 = 2 · 251+1, q = 227 = 2 ·113+1 be two 1-safe prime numbers.
Then n = p · q = 114181, and φ(n) = 113452. We suppose that the identity of a
user U is IU = 84314, and let g = 104 be an element of order p′ · q′ = 28363 in
Z∗114181. If the private key of U is xU = 64170, then fU = gxU modn = 86289.
Moreover, suppose that h(r) = 28, h(IU ) = 49, and h (IU )
−1modφ(n) = 53253.
The public key of U is computed by the system authority from equation (1):
yU = (86289− 84314)53253mod114181 = 19758.
3
The verification of this public key is immediate since(
y
h(IU )
U + IU
)
modn =
(
1975849 + 84314
)
mod 114181 = 86289
= gxU modn = 10464170mod 114181.
Now, we suppose that the user U wants to sign the message M = 48924.
Then U chooses k = 96230 at random and computes his signature for M as
follows:
r =M · g−kmodn = 48924 · 104−96230mod 114181 = 106361,
s = k − xU · h(r) = 96230− 64170 · 28 = −1700530.
From the signature (r, s) = (106361,−1700530), any user can recover the
original message by computing(
r · gs ·
(
y
h(IU )
U + IU
)h(r))
modn
=
(
106361 · 104−1700530 · (1975849 + 84314)28)mod 114181 = 48924 =M.
Nevertheless, the equation(
yh(IU ) + IU
)h(r)
≡ fh(r)U modn,
has more than one solution. In fact, the solutions to the equation(
y49 + 84314
)28 − 8628928 ≡ 0mod 114181
are
y1 = 19758, y2 = 33842, y3 = 51765, y4 = 65849,
and all of them permit to recover the original message, in spite of the fact that
only the first solution, y1 = yU , is the true public key of the user U :(
106361 · 104−1700530 · (y49i + 84314)28)mod114181 = 48924, i = 1, . . . , 4.
Moreover, in this situation, it is possible to factor the modulus n efficiently:
gcd
(((
y49j + 84314
)7 − 862897)mod 114181, 114181) = 503 = p,
gcd
(((
y49j + 84314
)7
+ 862897
)
mod 114181, 114181
)
= 227 = q,
where j = 2, 3.
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3 Analysis of the distinct proposals
Below, we analyse the different improvements and variants of the original scheme
[11] introduced in [1, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13].
1. In [11, Theorems 1 and 2] and in the proof of [11, Theorem 3] the authors
state that the public key yi is verified indirectly, which is not correct if
h(r) is even.
2. The same happens in the proposal of [12], since the authors do not modi-
fied this point in the Tseng-Jan-Chien original schemes.
3. The previous analysis also applies the the item 3 in the message recovery
phase in [9, Section].
4. Similarly, in the Properties 1, 2, and 3 in [1, Section 4] the equation
pi = (yi − di)h(di)
−1
modn has no meaning if h (di) is even. The same
happens in the improved scheme of [1] proposed in [13] because both
systems have the same initialization phase.
5. Finally, in [5, 10] the authors do not explain how the public key is verified
explicitly, but the equation to solve is the same as above and hence the
same reasoning can be applied.
4 Conclusions
We have seen that if the hash function h(·) is not relatively prime to φ(n), then
the modulus n can be factored. The condition h(m) < min (p′, q′) does not
suffice to assure that gcd (h(m), φ(n)) = 1. It is also necessary h(m) to be an
odd integer for all m. If h(m) is not odd, then the security of the self-certified
public keys schemes proposed in the references, is compromised. Moreover, the
authentication of the public key can be checked with probability 0.25 only.
The solution is simple: one must consider the hash function h(m) = 2H(m)+
1, where H(·) is either SHA1 ([2]) or MD5 ([8]) hash functions, which increases
5
the number of bits of h(·) by one at most.
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